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In Search of a Problem: Mapping Controversies over NHS (England) Patient 
Data with Digital Tools 
Introduction 
It’s no secret that Google has broad ambitions in healthcare. But a 
document obtained by New Scientist reveals that the tech giant’s 
collaboration with the UK’s National Health Service goes far beyond what 
has been publicly announced. The document––a data-sharing agreement 
between Google-owned artificial intelligence company DeepMind and the 
Royal Free NHS Trust––gives the clearest picture yet of what the 
company is doing and what sensitive data it now has access to. (Hodson 
2016) 
 
This is how New Scientist broke the story, in April 2016, that Google’s 
DeepMind subsidiary had been granted access to National Health Service (NHS) 
patient data in England1. NHS England is a statutory universal healthcare 
system, free at the point of need and funded through general taxation. It 
operates a federated model and depends on a network of privately owned 
suppliers to manage its IT and data services, but it is a public body. As such, 
the ethical, legal and commercial issues raised by an Information Sharing 
Agreement (ISA) between the NHS and a wholly owned subsidiary of one of the 
world’s most powerful tech companies provoked extensive coverage. The story 
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represents another turn in an eventful history of attempts to integrate patient 
data within a “digital first” paperless NHS (Department of Health 2012, 
2014).  
 
This history shows how patient data and its uses became the centre of 
unprecedented public attention. Science and Technology Studies (hereafter STS) 
scholarship has outlined how certain events develop into classic science 
controversies or public ‘issues’ that can be detected using particular tools and 
methodologies (Callon 1980, Marres 2005a; Barry 2012). The case of patient 
data sharing, although clearly controversial for some publics, has not taken the 
shape of a science controversy or public issue as defined within STS. This raises 
questions that we explore in this article about whether, and how, STS 
approaches can map events that are problematic, but do not conform to 
established definitions of issues or controversies.  
 
One possible solution emerges from the recent revival of interest within STS in 
problems, (Neyland and Milyaeva 2016; Savransky 2018 forthcoming).2  Perhaps 
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patient data is more of a problem than a public issue or controversy? In a 
pragmatist reading, problems emerge from, “indeterminate situations,” which, in 
Dewey’s (1938) sense, demand solutions but do not specify the manner of their 
solution. This formulation may offer a better fit for analyzing cases as ill-
defined, multiple and elusive as the recent history of NHS patient data sharing 
initiatives. To test this, we staged an empirical experiment using a series of 
digital tools to locate and map the problem(s) posed by patient data.  
 
This paper is an outcome of a Wellcome Trust funded project exploring the 
implications of digital technology and big data for the payment and provision of 
healthcare.3 The project employed a mixed methodology including interviews, 
participant observation, documentary analysis and digital methods. We focus on 
the latter here for two reasons. First, quantitative, digital methods have a 
history in STS of being used to detect “problematic objects” such as 
controversies, issues, and matters of concern. Given that these problematic 
objects are highly distributed and unstable, digital methods or tools have been 
adopted as an aid in mapping their terrain (Venturini 2010). Second, digital 
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methodologies have inherited something of the standard critique levelled at 
quantitative methods, of lacking the capacity of qualitative methods to convey 
nuance and complexity. Our aim in using them in the project, and in focusing on 
them in this article, was in part an experiment in what off-the-peg digital tools 
can reveal and whether they can effectively represent indeterminacy. 
Experimenting with digital tools helps raise broader methodological concerns about 
the boundaries of study, the sorts of entities that are in scope and the sorts 
that get left out.  
 
We begin by introducing the case of patient data sharing in NHS England’s 
through two high profile cases: the Department of Health’s care.data project 
and Google DeepMind’s data sharing agreement with the Royal Free London NHS 
Foundation Trust. We move, in the following section, to describe how 
“problematic objects” of various types have been defined in STS. This paves the 
way for a review of how digital tools have been leveraged in the past to study 
such objects. Finally we report back on the results of our experiment in using 
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similar tools to locate the problem of patient data in a range of different 
settings.  
 
 
Patient Data and NHS England 
In a context in which growing, aging, and sicker populations are testing the 
capacities of healthcare systems everywhere to provide accessible, quality, 
affordable care, digital health tools and so called “big data” offer an alluring 
solution. Governments globally have responded with “connected,” “precision,” and 
“personalized” healthcare strategies with big data and digital innovation at their 
core. But, as demonstrated in recent cases across Europe and the US, strange 
things can happen when big health and biomedical data allow governments to 
think differently about how healthcare might be managed.4 The catalyst for this 
paper was the passing of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSC) by the 
coalition Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in the UK. The HSC, and 
the accompanying policy document, The Power of Information, outlined a 
strategy “to harness information and new technologies to achieve higher quality 
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care and improve outcomes” (Department of Health 2012: 4-6). The way 
information was collected and used was to be transformed to support an 
innovative, integrated and transparent “no decision about me, without me” 
culture. These principles seem unobjectionable, but the manner of their 
implementation was fraught from the outset. Controversy surrounded the HSC 
because it was interpreted, with cause, as an attempt to extend the scope of 
marketization and privatization within the NHS.5 This led, more or less directly, 
to the two cases we describe briefly below: the care.data program, and the 
Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust/ Google DeepMind collaboration.  
 
Care.data 
The HSC’s most notable features included the introduction of new data-based 
forms of accountability and the reengineering of primary care. Clinical data were 
to be combined with patient outcome and experience data to create the 
“highest quality of care” (Speed and Gabe 2013). At the same time, GPs6 
would assume an enlarged role, leading newly established Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) with direct control over the provision of local healthcare. These 
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changes were designed to improve cost efficiency and quality, in part by 
strengthening the role GPs play in promoting public health to prevent the need 
for further primary and secondary care.  
 
The strategy demanded new structures and processes to manage the “connected 
information for integrated care” that would be required. A new Health and 
Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC)7 was established as the focal point for 
nationally collected NHS, public health, and social care data. Its objectives to 
make anonymized data available, accessible, and convenient, and to integrate data 
from different sources across primary, secondary, and social care, were 
prominently expressed in the Department of Health’s 2012 policy document. 
Less prominent, the HSCIC was also charged with making its data available to 
third parties and “information intermediaries” to bolster the UK’s position in 
global health industries. 
With greater access to health and care data, the UK can become a centre 
of excellence for health and care IT and informatics, playing a prominent 
part in a global industry which will deliver economic growth. […] The 
ability to draw upon a wealth of linked, then anonymised, data from these 
invaluable services to improve health and care––when coupled with other 
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resources such as the UK Biobank––will serve to reinforce this country’s 
reputation as a global centre for health and care data and research 
(Department of Health 2012: 86-87). 
 
Throughout the document, problems and their solutions were outlined in 
structural, plumbing-like terms. Information and data were “disjointed,” 
duplicated, and inaccessible where they needed to flow smoothly and be shared 
more freely. This framing of the problem was carried into the care.data program 
and it likely contributed to the program’s short, farcical, and well-documented 
history (c.f. Presser et al. 2015; Vezyridis and Timmons 2016, 2017). 
Care.data was meant to “securely bring together health and social care 
information from different healthcare settings, such as GP practices, hospitals 
and care homes” to be held by the HSCIC.8 Through it, a wealth of patient-
identifiable information derived from primary care, such as NHS numbers, date 
of birth, postcode and gender, family history, vaccinations, diagnoses, referrals, 
and prescriptions would be collected. In line with the objective of using the data 
to secure economic advantage, the program would also allow ‘customers’ – that 
is external organizations, including those from the private sector– the 
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opportunity to link their own data sets to pseudonymized NHS datasets 
(Vezyridis and Timmons 2016).  
 
 
Figure 1. Better Information Means Better Care (extract) 
 
In January 2014, patients were informed that the care.data program was 
underway by means of an NHS England leaflet, Better Information Means Better 
Care. The leaflet was produced only after pressure from GPs concerned about 
the way the HSC and the program approached patient data sharing. It was to 
be delivered to an estimated 26 million households but as an unaddressed ‘flyer’ 
that could be mistaken for junk mail it had limited impact on public awareness 
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(Presser et al. 2015). Care.data allowed patients to opt out of a) having their 
data sent to the HSCIC and b) having their data leave the HSCIC for other 
uses. The leaflet was meant to explain how patient information would be used 
and what choices patients had. Those who saw it at all were presented with 
assurances that “only the minimum information needed to improve patient care” 
would be used, but no details were given about what form that use might take 
or who the users of their data might be. This left patients to make decisions 
about whether their data could be used without any clear explanation of what it 
might be used for. To compound this, opt-out forms were not supplied with the 
leaflet but left to GP practices to produce, resulting in over 100 variations 
(Vezyridis and Timmons 2016). Within a few weeks of the leafleting campaign, 
over 1 million people, or nearly 1 in 45 citizens, had chosen to opt out.  
 
The NHS/DeepMind collaboration 
A more recent case suggests that little has been learned from the care.data 
debacle. Google’s Artificial Intelligence subsidiary, DeepMind, began working with 
the Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust in 2015 to develop an app for detecting 
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acute kidney injuries (AKI). The collaboration prompted a series of mainly 
positive articles in the technology, healthcare, and mainstream media.9 Co-
founder Mustafa Suleyman gave presentations at key conferences including the 
Kings Fund in 2015 and the Royal Society of Medicine in 2016. Laudatory 
coverage ended abruptly on 29 April 2016 when Hal Hodson, then a journalist 
at the New Scientist, disclosed the contents of an Information Sharing 
Agreement (ISA) granting the company access to five years of data, on 1.6 
million patients, most of whom had never been diagnosed with kidney disease. 
Questions about why access on this scale was necessary and whether it was 
compliant with existing health data regulations began to dominate coverage, 
which spiked sharply10 after Hodson’s article appeared. The case is emblematic of 
the broader challenges the increasing use of private sector solutions for public 
sector problems provokes (c.f. Neyland and Milyaeva 2016). As Powles and 
Hodson explained. 
 
Without scrutiny (and perhaps even encouraged competition) Google and 
DeepMind could quickly obtain a monopolistic position over health analytics 
in the UK and internationally. Indeed, the companies are already in key 
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positions in policy discussions on standards and digital reform. If a 
comprehensive, forward-thinking and creative regulatory response is not 
envisaged now, health services could find themselves washed onwards in a 
tide of efficiency and convenience, controlled more by Google than by 
publicly-mind health practitioners. Aggregating and centralizing control of 
health data and its analysis will generate levers that exist beyond 
democratic control, with no guarantees except for corporate branding and 
trust as to where they might end up (2017, 357). 
 
 
The concerns expressed by Powles, Hodson and other campaigners were borne 
out, at least in part, when the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) ruled in 
July 2017 that the Royal Free Foundation had failed to comply with data 
protection law and “could and should have been far more transparent with 
patients as to what was happening.”11  
 
Problematic Objects and Digital Tools 
These incidents have many of the features attributed in STS scholarship to a 
classic socio-technical “issue.” An issue arises when existing political institutions 
cannot deal with adequately with a particular problem. In this case, the issue of 
health data sharing, the flawed opt-out form designed to deal with it and the 
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news story, respectively, make an emergent ‘concerned public’ visible and force 
existing institutions to respond. The concept of “issues” has been elaborated in 
STS most explicitly by Noortje Marres (2005a; 2012). Issues, in Marres’ 
account, are objects around which concerned publics gather when the 
consequences of particular actions are articulated as shared. This concept, which 
draws on John Dewey and Walter Lippmann’s debate about technical democracy, 
shares lineage with other troubling objects in STS. Controversies, for instance, 
have a long history as a methodological trope that helps researchers unpack 
taken-for-granted dichotomies allowing access to facets of social and technical life 
that would be invisible, or black boxed, when everything is running smoothly 
(Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Marres and Moats, 2015). Matters of concern, 
like issues, have been used to describe objects like climate change that are 
complex, distributed, and composed of heterogeneous actors but do not 
necessarily turn on controversies over knowledge and science (Latour, 2004). 
 
Yet the patient data case does not quite fit the parameters of a lively issue, 
controversy, or a matter of concern. While there have been spokespeople for 
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“the public” and opposition groups, the issue seems to have been “displaced” 
(Marres 2005a) or dispersed from “the public” to arenas like the legal sphere, 
social media, and technical discussions. Attempts to publicize the issue through 
leaks and reports have not resulted in a cohesive opposition or coherent 
alternative propositions. So how do we study what appears to be a dormant 
issue when many STS scholars regard issues or controversies as best studied when 
they are “hot” (Callon et al. 2001; Venturini 2010)?  
 
In their discussion of recent government attempts to apply market logics and 
mechanisms to “solve problems,” Neyland and Milyaeva (2016) draw on several 
insights from the history of STS about problems, such as their reciprocal 
relationship to solutions. But what exactly is a “problem” and how does it 
relate to the more familiar concepts of controversy and issue? 
 
In one of the earliest discussions in STS, Callon (1980) argued that the 
definition of problems in science often implies their likely solution and the 
collection of actors poised to solve them. These highly contingent articulations, 
 15 
or “problematisations” (Callon et al. 1986), are a fundamental aspect of power 
and enrolment into networks. What distinguishes problematizations from issue 
articulations12 is that the former are inextricably, if implicitly, linked with 
particular solutions, and that they tend to arise within expert communities 
rather than “in the wild” (Callon et al. 2001). We might also associate 
problematizations with a logic of problem solving, or dealing with problems in a 
procedural way “…accepting the problem-definitions already on the table” 
(Zuiderent-Jerak 2015). Within STS, however, ‘problems’ appear to demand 
radical shifts in existing frames of reference. 
 
In another formulation, Martin Savranksy (2018) linked problems to the work 
of Isabelle Stengers and Deleuze. Stengers (2000) has used the concept of 
“events” to describe occasions for which there is a definite ‘before’ and an 
‘after’. It is through these temporal stages that the identities of the entities 
emerge––they are not given before it. Savransky explains that events are 
inherently “problematic.” This is similar to Dewey’s formulation of the 
“indeterminate situations” that precede problems. Events demand that possible 
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futures be accommodated in the present but leave open the question of which 
actions should be taken. We might then use the term “problematic events” to 
describe situations prior to their settled definition and prior to the attachment 
of assumptions, procedures and “devices” (Marres 2012) that make them more 
determinate. In this formulation, problems exist independently of any attempts 
to articulate them. Problems are not a construct of the researcher but are an 
actual tension in the world (Dewey 1938). They have what Savransky describes 
as a “thickness”, a material presence, even while their contours remain elusive. 
 
Yet while problematic events may exert an actual force, we have no empirical 
access to them except through our attempts to articulate them. This moment 
of articulating or describing a problematic event is what STS researchers mean 
by problematization  –– the process that transforms events into lively issues or 
problems. The question then becomes, what does it mean to study problems as 
problematic events, events that lack settled definition? Can problems help us 
understand situations that do not conform to our understanding of issues, that 
have yet to acquire publics, or that are not fully-fledged controversies? Is there 
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an analytic advantage to be had by embracing indeterminacy rather than trying 
merely to study and criticize existing problem definitions? Below we explore 
these questions by staging an empirical experiment using the kind of digital 
methods originally developed to study issues and problematizations as defined in 
STS. The results describe a case for maintaining an open and exploratory 
attitude both to problem definition and the role digital tools might play in 
addressing them. 
 
Digital Tools  
Studying controversies or problems has been associated with ethnographic, 
qualitative textual, and archival analysis (Latour 2005, 1988); but there is 
another tradition of using quantitative tools for making them visible. For 
example, the co-word analysis technique was developed to map “shared 
problematisations” (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Callon, Law and Rip [eds.] 
1986). Scientists advance their projects by articulating the problems of different 
actors as shared––thus enrolling different parties. So, the problem of discovering 
some elusive protein becomes the problem of developing some measurement 
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device. Using a corpus of scientific abstracts, Callon and collaborators selected 
certain terms known to index problems and counted the number of times they 
appeared together. The more often they appeared together, the stronger the 
association. By visualizing these connections as a network, and comparing 
networks over time, the emergence of new instruments, natural phenomena, and 
even scientific fields can be seen.  
 
 
Figure 2. Co-Word Network (from Callon et al., 1986). 
 
Inspired by work in scientometrics, STS researchers later developed a tool for 
mapping public issues on the web. Issuecrawler maps a network of the 
hyperlinked actors that gather around particular issues. The user inputs a series 
of websites and Issuecrawler collects all the hyperlinks on these pages, and then 
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all the hyperlinks on those pages for a set number of iterations. Then, by  
filtering out pages which have less connections than others, it reduces the larger 
network to reveal the most connected websites. Issuecrawler maps often reveal a 
mix of government bodies, NGOs, multi-national corporations, blogs and news 
devoted to the topic and how they link (or do not link) to each other. 
Interesting patterns can emerge from the presence and absence of links, for 
example, when an NGO links to the relevant government agency but that agency 
does not reciprocate (Rogers and Marres 2000). This suggests how certain 
actors control the shape that the network takes and the channels through which 
information becomes available.  
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Figure 3. Issue-Network (from Marres and Rogers 2005) 
 
More recently, researchers have used social media platforms to map issues, 
especially Twitter. Twitter is interesting, because, like home-made pages in the 
early days of the web, it has an anarchic quality, which means that it 
potentially overwhelms the restrictive framings and problem-definitions of large 
institutions and thus has the potential to disclose emergent publics (Bruns and 
Burgess 2015; Marres and Weltevrede 2013). Marres and Weltevrede have used 
co-hashtag networks, inspired by co-word networks, to create networks of 
hashtags appearing together in tweets. These can be viewed over time using a 
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tool called the “associational profiler,” which ranks the hashtags most associated 
with other hashtags. 
 
 
Figure 4: Associational Profile (from Marres and Moats, 2015) 
 
The graph presented in Figure 4 shows the top hashtags associated with the 
hashtag #privacy over a period of a week. It shows how ambient concerns around 
personal privacy become both more focused around a few key tags (#prism, 
#surveilance) and more politicized (#bigbrother, #obama) following the 2013 
revelations about the NSA collecting data on US citizens. For Marres, these 
tools make partially visible the elusive moment of “issuefication,” when 
indeterminate situations start to take shape.  
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So, within STS, digital tools have been helpful for researching problematizations 
and issues. In fact, as issues become more distributed and complex with more 
players, publics and information, they may demand mapping techniques to make 
sense of them (Venturini, 2010). The challenge is that, as noted earlier, not all 
problems take the form of well-defined issues or controversies; nor do they all 
coalesce in accessible, structured venues such as the web, twitter or scientific 
journals. There are no existing tools for detecting problematic events in the raw, 
general sense prior to their articulation and this may, by definition, be an 
impossible task, because these tools rely on there being particular articulations of 
a problem out there in public that can be latched on to. Nevertheless, we 
attempted an experiment: to map the problem using these tools to see to what 
extent this case conformed or exceeded the classic STS understandings of 
problems, and to see how this excess could be mapped, if at all. This was not a 
“controlled experiment” in any formal sense but an open-ended exploration of 
the methodological challenges involved in studying problems.  
 
Institutional Problematizations? 
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Perhaps the easiest place to start searching for the problem is within the set of 
institutions that ultimately failed to contain it. In 1997, Dame Fiona Caldicott 
was tasked with writing a report about information governance (Department of 
Health 1997). In 2013 she was asked to write a second report just before the 
care.data scandal and prepared a follow-up in 2016 as a direct result of the 
scandal (Caldicott 2013; 2016). To help understand how the problem of patient 
data has shifted over time, we produced a sequence of co-word maps for the 
first, second and third (2016) reports.13 
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Figure 5: Co-word of terms in the Caldicott Report (1997 vs 2013 vs 2016) ranked vertically by 
degree (number of connections) and arranged horizontally by cluster[1] 
 
Between these three graphs there are obvious shifts in terminology. This has as 
much to do with the time in which they were written as with the content of 
the reports. “Information,” for example, is supplanted by “data” as the key 
buzz-word while names like “Health and Social Care Act,” “Health and Social 
Care Information Centre” create tight clusters between those words. These 
terms and how they are linked have performative effects. That the words health 
and care come together is not just a linguistic accident but a clue that material 
transformations are at stake . The coming together of “Health and Social Care” 
as acts of governmental speech, signals a new policy objective to connect the 
data infrastructures of health and social care services. That the restructuring has 
not yet adequately connected health and social care infrastructures and practices, 
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does not diminish its significance as it has had a major and undesired overflow 
effect –– making citizens very nervous about what could happen to their data.  
 
There are substantive elements that do, nevertheless, come through. The cluster 
of words that includes “individual,” “patients” and “confidentiality” in the first 
map shifts to a cluster that prominently includes “public” and “people” in the 
last map. This reflects the shift in rhetoric from confidentiality and data sharing 
as a personal, individualized issue to a shared concern (both in data protection 
and data use for public health). But to understand more about these shifts we 
need to dive into the reports themselves. 
 
The problem in the first report was framed in terms of information security: 
that is making sure the information stayed within the NHS and was properly 
anonymized. The report mapped various information flows and demanded that 
patient identifiable data should be shared only when necessary and in their most 
minimal form. NHS ‘Data Guardians’ were created to enforce these standards. 
This solved the problem as defined in the early report. Yet, in doing so, it 
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created another problem: NHS workers were so scared of data breaches that 
they were reluctant to share data between trusts and, especially, outside the 
NHS (Department of Health 2012). This relates to Neyland and Milyaeva's 
(2016) point that solutions to problems often generate their own problems. In 
the second report, in 2013, the emphasis shifted to ensuring data were made 
available for “direct care,” including research, commissioning, or public health 
through implied consent, while any other, “secondary” uses would require explicit 
consent.  
 
When care.data was eventually announced, the Department of Health did not 
anticipate the degree of outrage over private companies––particularly those from 
sectors like insurance and marketing––accessing and using the data. In February 
2014, The Telegraph published a story claiming that NHS data had already been 
sold to insurance companies and were being used to inform increases to the price 
of critical illness insurance policies (Donnelly, 2014).14 By then, care.data was on 
hold. The third Caldicott report (2016) focused specifically on this consent 
problem using a survey and focus groups. These more traditional technologies of 
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participation perform very specific assumptions about the nature of public 
opinion (Lezaun, 2007) that translate the issue in particular ways. The report 
remarked that public views on data sharing had changed little since 2013. People 
still accepted that their information would be used to support their care and 
found it frustrating to repeat the same information to different healthcare 
professionals. Views about information being used for purposes other than 
“direct care” were more mixed, with some “suspicious that information might be 
used by commercial companies for marketing or insurance” while others 
“prioritise the sharing of information to improve health and social care, and for 
research into new treatments” (Caldicott, 2016: 6).  
 
These findings accord with a Wellcome Trust (2016) report exploring public 
attitudes to commercial access to data. This began by acknowledging that, when 
asked, most people say they do not want their health records shared with 
private companies. However, this unequivocal position should be measured against 
the low level of public understanding of how healthcare works. Research 
participants “did not know that commercial companies already play a part in 
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delivering healthcare and biomedical research.” They had little understanding of 
existing safeguarding regulations or how the NHS already uses anonymized data 
for which no opt-out is available.  
 
This all frames the problem as one of communication rather than of taking 
seriously public concerns about the privacy, efficacy, and security of data-driven 
research. The third report elaborated the consent model and tried to specify 
precisely where the distinction lies between direct care, that does not require 
consent, and secondary uses, that do. For medConfidential, an activist 
organization advocating patient rights and privacy in relation to their data, the 
distinction was still too vague. What about secondary uses that lead eventually 
to direct care? Do they require consent? If so, what time period has to elapse? 
As Powles and Hodson  put it, “institutional and regulatory responses are 
insufficiently robust and agile to properly respond to the challenges presented by 
data politics and the rise of algorithmic tools in healthcare” (2017, 351). 
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In this case, while co-word analysis does give us a broad sense of changing 
language over time, the problematizations are under-specified in the maps. This 
could be because of the slightly different approach used by Callon and his 
colleagues or it could be because of the formal differences between scientific 
abstracts and lengthy policy documents. It is also possible that the problem 
arises from the repetitive and somewhat vague tone of the language often 
adopted in policy documents. In any case, we are confronted by the fact that 
these documents are only the outward manifestation of more complex back-room 
discussions and other techniques and processes like focus groups and surveys. 
 
Issues 
We explained earlier how the care.data opt-out forms became a device that 
allowed opposition to the proposed changes to be counted. The forms provided 
some means for an incipient public to express itself, but this was curtailed by a 
multiple-choice format that left no space for nuanced or alternative 
formulations. So, where else might this public-in-the making materialize? In 
2015, we used issue crawler to see if we could detect an issue network. We 
 30 
tried several different configurations of the key actors (the HSCIC, Department 
of Health and the care.data programme), but the crawl returned mostly actors 
that were not issue-specific. It tended to get stuck in either collections of 
conventional media and social media websites (Facebook, Twitter, BBC) or in the 
labyrinth of over 3000 NHS websites15.  
 
 
Figure 6. Issuecrawler co-link map using starting points: http://digital.nhs.uk, 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk, https://medconfidential.org, 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-information-board 
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One possible conclusion we could draw is that these maps show that there is no 
public issue here. It is equally possible, however, that this negative result is an 
effect of the medium. This raises some interesting questions about how digital 
methodologies and tools work and how they cope with a rapidly changing, mobile 
and responsive web environment.  Different types of organization use websites in 
different ways, and websites themselves are used differently today than they 
were when Issuecrawler was developed. The NHS tends to use links pages to 
direct users to relevant organizations and contact points. Opposition groups like 
medConfidential do not link to the NHS but rather primarily to news stories 
and likeminded organizations for example Privacy International and Big Brother 
Watch. These differences in how links are used mean that Issuecrawler may not 
map the connections between organizations with an issue in common. In an 
effort to work round this, we turned to colleagues working on the BiMeDa 
project16 who provided us with an expert curated list of the key players. Rather 
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than using the issue crawler to “discover” the issue network, this allowed us to 
map the politics of linking within the network through an “inter-actor” map. 
 
 
Figure 7. Issuecrawler “interactor” map of actors supplied by the BiMeDa project in Jan 2016 
 
 
In this curated list, NHS bodies link internally, but neither they, nor 
medConfidential, link to each other. The two do not appear as distinct clusters 
in the map only because established media and specialized blogs stitch the issue 
together by linking to both. The issue, at least as defined qualitatively by our 
BiMeDa colleagues, does not appear to take the familiar shape of past issues, 
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either because of the indeterminacy of the issue and its boundaries, or because 
of shifts in the way debates happen online. This is not to suggest that the issue 
or debates are not happening “out-there” in public: we knew from the 
documentary analysis, participant observation and interviews that many of the 
key debates, discussions and decisions about patient data were happening––not on 
the web per se, but across a loosely connected network of private and public 
meetings as well as on blogs and social media.  
 
Social media may offer a more dynamic platform for the discussion of data than 
the web. It extends and enhances the internet’s capacities to reconfigure 
proximities, altering what it means to be present and absent from the physical 
locations at which debate is taking place. This became clear to us as we moved 
between attending conferences and tracking the activity around their hashtags. 
We collected Tweets from Kings Fund Digital 2015 (#KFDigital15), Stanford 
Medicine X (#medx) and the Financial Times Digital Health Conference 
(#FTDighealth). We then combined and visualized them as a composite co-
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hashtag network: hashtags that appear in the same tweet are connected and the 
more times they appear together the stronger the connection. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Co-hashtag map of digital health conference hashtags in 2015 (detail below) 
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These conferences took place in different continents and timezones, but there 
was significant overlap in hashtag use and in users. Different names (#mhealth, 
#ehealth, #digitalhealth) for the complex intersection of tech and healthcare can 
be seen vying for attention. We were again unable to detect a lively issue. Only 
a tiny cluster of hashtags (see detail of Figure 8), within a space devoted to 
data and healthcare, referred to privacy concerns or care.data specifically. These 
included #privacy, #identitytheft, #records, #protectourdata, and on the other 
side #freethedata, #datasharing and the campaign #datasaveslives. These 
hashtags present different articulations of the issue but they are emerging from 
only a handful of privacy specialists and an even smaller group of data sharing 
advocates. It is possible that the issue was obscured by the sector’s 
characteristic hyperbole of self-styled “influencers” and promotional discourse, 
but, again, it is also possible that it is no longer a vibrant issue on Twitter, 
several months after the care.data programme was paused in February 2014. 
The map does elucidate the generally accepted terms of the debate: privacy is a 
right that must be protected, but data might save lives/funds. Both sides of 
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the debate accept these premises and frame the issue as a trade-off differing 
mainly on where they draw the line (Zarsky, 2016). One user made exactly this 
point in a presentation slide.17 
 
 
Figure 9: Tweet by Joe_stringer1: rt @bleddyn_rees: #digitalhealth #bigdata not convinced it 
is one or the other choice. #privacy  https://t.co/5hkarprsh8-Joe_stringer1 Sun Jun 14 
21:04:30 +0000 2015 
 
 
 
Research in STS has complicated the debate about trade-offs in data sharing. 
Gregory and Bowker (2016) question whether complete privacy is logically 
possible. Seeing the self, “the citizen in there (beneath the naked skin) and 
data about the citizen out there (circulating within ever denser industrial and 
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governmental networks)” they argue, is misconceived (2016, 211). The very 
concept of the self is contingent on its representation through data. Others 
have debated the idea that large digital datasets, in themselves, can even solve 
problems, let alone save lives (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Poon, 2016; Uprichard, 
2013). These debates are important but they offer little guidance about how 
particular patient data could be leveraged to solve particular problems. Part of 
the challenge is the very framing of private consequences and public benefits as 
conceptually distinct (Birkbak, 2013; Marres, 2005a). 
 
A more methodological challenge concerns the distinction between private and 
public settings. What gets discussed behind closed doors, in putatively “public” 
forums or in the hybrid locations between? What materials become accessible to 
the researcher? In June 2015 team members attending the King’s Fund Digital 
Health and Care Congress soon noticed that conference participants were using 
social media and face-to-face interactions to continue earlier conversations. We 
noted multi-site, multi-platform conversations moving across public Q&A 
discussion sessions, private face-to-face, Facebook, Twitter and the conference’s 
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own bespoke messaging platform. There was talk during presentations using social 
media, during Q&A sessions and breaks involving both delegates and people who 
were not at the conference but “following” it through the hashtag.  
 
These patterns of interaction, and the problems, issues and controversies that 
underlie them are not apparent in the hashtag activity we tracked. Field notes 
of the events reveal that patient data, and care.data in particular, were 
frequently invoked by delegates as “issues” in achieving the digital health visions 
promised in policy reports (Department of Health, 2012; 2014). At 
conferences, but not so much on Twitter, care.data was shorthand for how far 
the NHS was from the Department of Health’s paperless, digital-by-default 
vision.  
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Figure 10. Jeremy Hunt and Tim Kelsey on a visit to Silicon Valley, September 2015 
 
 
One episode stands out. Malay Gandhi, then CEO of Rock Health, a digital 
health venture capital fund, mentioned in conversation with one of us that 
Rock Health had that morning hosted a delegation including the then Secretary 
of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt and Tim Kelsey, at the time the NHS 
Director of Patients and Information and chief architect of care.data. The trip 
was not secret but neither was it widely reported. Given that Jeremy Hunt was 
that same week dominating headlines in the wake of the controversial changes he 
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proposed to the junior doctors’ contract and the still unravelling mess of 
care.data, the Silicon Valley visit might have garnered some attention. Care.data, 
the new junior doctors’ contract, and the role of private technology companies 
in the NHS all touch on deep sensitivities surrounding what, for many, amounts 
to stealth privatization of the NHS18. So, on one hand, it seems that 
potentially important decisions about patient data are not happening in plain 
sight on the web or Twitter, and yet, paradoxically, Twitter can be the means 
that reveals them.19 Social media, Freedom of Information (FoI) requests and 
leaks all problematize the boundary between public debate and private decision 
making, and this distinction, on which some digital tools rest, is at stake in the 
problem.  
 
 
Problematic Events 
While the concepts of problematization and issue, and the tools associated with 
their analysis, have been helpful for thinking through the case, they have to 
some extent failed to define or explain the problem we are in search of. We 
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decided to experiment with another way of mapping the patient data sharing 
problem which did not rely so heavily on these well-established spokespeople, 
devices and representations. Since problems tend to straddle public debates and 
closed expert discussions, is there any way of seeing what lies between the two? 
As mentioned earlier: there are no ready-made tools for tracking problematic 
events, but with the upheaval they create, they should be detectable, if not 
fully representable. One recurring character throughout this story has been 
journalists, who stitched together the issue network and, through leaks, provided 
much of the drama. Perhaps we can map their interventions? Our strategy was 
to first start with a kind of appropriate baseline, a grey backdrop against which 
the before and after could become obvious. We chose some search terms 
(“NHS,” “patient” and “data”) to collect news articles in the period Jun 
2013-16, using a toll called the Google News Scraper, which queries the search 
algorithm for news articles (based on Google’s highly contingent categorization of 
news). This would allow us to visualize the general topic area in which the 
problem might emerge. 
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Figure 11: Streamgraph of articles containing the words “NHS,” “patient” and “data” – 
according to Google News API. 
 
In Figure 11, above, the corpus of articles was grouped by media outlet (e.g. 
bbc.co.uk) and by day, and then visualized as a stream graph. Each coloured band 
corresponds to a specific outlet, from bottom to top, in the order in which 
they first appear in the data set. From this data, we could deduce that the 
topic has exploded over time, but this would be hasty. Google’s algorithm 
favours more recent articles because some articles have been deleted or archived 
and because the crawling bots constantly discover new sources. This means that 
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not all the growth is as event-driven as it appears. What is more striking is how 
the number and variety of media outlets involved grows near the end. The 
collective centered around the topic becomes more heterogeneous as it moves 
from more specialized coverage in healthcare and tech to a more general 
audience. The event multiplies the number and variety of entities that are 
concerned with the problem. 
 
If we examine the various spikes, all of which more-or-less correspond to scandals 
or events, and analyze some of the articles that make them up, we can see 
that most of them refer to care.data, including the leaflet campaign itself and 
Tim Kelsey’s resignation. The second biggest spike (towards the right of the 
graph) relates to the Google DeepMind story and it dwarfs the earlier spikes. 
This is the aftermath of New Scientist’s report that the DeepMind/Royal Free 
Trust agreement went far beyond what had been announced publicly and specified 
that the data need not be anonymized. However, in an editorial, Suleyman 
pointed out that Google nonetheless did anonymize the data as a matter of 
protocol.20  Also, other organizations have had access to similar data sets, and 
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there are clear prohibitions against using the data commercially. As successive 
governments have opened the door to private providers, contractors, and 
consultants, it has become harder to disentangle the “public” NHS from 
“private” corporate interests. This raises the question: what is it about Google 
DeepMind that caused such a stir? Is it perhaps because Google, particularly its 
AI wing, kindles sci-fi scenarios? Or is it because of the obvious potential for 
commercial uses of this data linked to Google’s main business: online advertising. 
This scandal discloses conflicting attachments between NHS organizations and 
private companies, on the one hand, and doctors and patients, on the other 
(Marres, 2005b). It also showcases overflows in what the 2016 Caldicott 
report defines as “data for direct care,” which does not require explicit consent, 
and “secondary uses” which does As Powles and Hodson (2017) argue, the Royal 
Free/DeepMind ISA is careless with the crucial distinction between data for 
direct care versus data for secondary uses. The experiment was speculatively 
using data, only a portion of which had the potential to contribute to acute 
care technologies, therefore much of the data used, in all probability, did require 
explicit consent. 
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The biggest spike, however, relates to stories about the junior doctors’ strike. 
When Jeremy Hunt proposed a new contract, many revolted, arguing that the 
new proposals for weekend working––referred to as a “seven day NHS,”–– would 
reduce patient safety. The public protests were galvanized by a concern that the 
resulting chaos was a deliberate ploy in an ongoing plot to privatize the NHS. 
Problematic events are always situated, and positioned in relation to other 
problems, controversies and events in the larger field (Barry, 2012).  
 
We could say that the emergence of the junior doctor’s strike in this dataset is 
an artefact of the data extraction process: since the strike dominated the news, 
any story that mentioned “data,” “NHS,” and “patients” would be counted. 
“Data” could also refer to non-patient data or even appear elsewhere on the 
page. We could also say, however, that the doctor’s strike looms large over the 
data breaches. One explanation for the Conservative government and the 
Department of Health’s interest in algorithmic and digital healthcare is that by 
taking key tasks, like triage, out of doctors’ hands, they could increase efficiency 
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while diluting the collective power that the British Medical Association, the body 
that represents junior doctors, has historically wielded. 
 
The graph says as much about Google as it does about the case. The distinction 
Google makes between news and blogs is arbitrary, as is the bias towards the 
new at the expense of the old. While the baseline helps us to pick out variation, 
the event redefines the baseline and we should not make strong claims about the 
prevalence of stories. It is undeniable, though, that the problem seems far more 
lively in this journalistic arena than on the web or social media. Also, since we 
picked a very general phrasing of the problem, this graph expands our 
understanding of the entities and issues to which the problem is connected. 
Finally, this graph gives us some sense of the force required to develop the 
problem and gather these entities. If we look at some of the main spikes here, 
and ask ourselves where these shifts in the controversy come from, it seems 
clear that while a handful are driven by NHS announcements and the initial 
public outrage, news outlets are a key driver of the controversy. 
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This raises interesting questions about our own involvement in the problem and 
possible ways to intervene in it. If news articles and editorials have a seismic 
effect on the problem, then social science descriptions, hidden behind paywalls 
and dense academic prose, are probably not the most effective mechanism for 
intervening. In our project, we experimented with using a blog, participating in 
social media debates, and using our digital tools as engagement techniques to 
enrol informants and (hopefully) shift the conversation; but we may need more 
visible venues to publicize the problem. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we used a series of digital tools to track an elusive problem and 
found that these tools, which are adapted to the study of expert 
problematizations and public issues, failed to capture the empirical case. 
Obviously, the legal definitions of the problem, as revealed through our co-word 
analysis of the Caldicott reports, generated new problems that needed to be 
addressed. Yet these problems did not seem to manifest themselves as issues, 
either through their web presence or on Twitter. The question then becomes: is 
 48 
this a failure of the tools, bad study design a lack of knowledge on our part, or 
is the situation actually indeterminate in Dewey’s sense?  
 
Research tools may simply be unable to represent problems, understood as 
problematic events. Problems infect and confound established tools, destabilizing 
categories, identities and assumptions. As Isabelle Stengers notes, they change 
the researcher as well (1999), forcing them to rethink what is being studied. 
This point is well understood in social research. While we have used digital tools 
to draw attention to it, the difficulties we encountered are comparable to those 
encounters in qualitative research. Who are we interviewing? Does the 
controversy play out in policy reports, online, behind closed doors? These are 
dilemmas are an inherent part of the empirical problem. 
 
Bluntly, our digital tools failed. Yet we learned a great deal about the case by 
experimenting with them. They allowed us to move between different arenas 
very quickly without deciding in advance where the problem manifested itself. We 
learned that it is counterproductive to frame the issue as a trade-off between 
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individual security and collective benefits. A much more useful approach might 
emerge from articulating specific, contextual rather than general or universal 
relationships between the two. Digital tools also allowed us to see the problem 
being displaced to closed, but still leaky spaces, which journalists, leaks and 
scandals have the power to re-publicize. Finally, we learned that despite the 
instability of distinctions between public sector and private sector entities, 
notably in the operational co-dependence of the NHS and private suppliers, 
these entities are constantly leveraged as a rallying cry for concerned publics. 
Existing governmental articulations of patient data sharing as a technical matter 
that can be dealt with by communication, encryption and opt-outs, have 
seemingly failed in their attempts to sideline legitimate political concerns about 
privatization and the historical tensions between the government, the 
Department of Health and the medical profession. 
 
There are a few take-aways from this experiment. First, maintaining a broad and 
open definition of the problem matters. Dwelling in the indeterminacy, rather 
than stepping on the firm ground of our own or others’ problem-definitions, 
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means getting a better sense of what is at stake and how things could be 
otherwise. Second, it seems clear that we need methods that adapt to problems 
rather than relying on readymade solutions. In the course of our research we had 
to modify the Issuecrawler to make it work and fashion a simple-bespoke 
visualization to map the journalistic issue space. Both qualitative and 
quantitative methods are tied to types of empirical materials and devices, and 
to certain assumptions about social life. Taking problems seriously means 
considering different locales, corpuses of texts and other forms of research 
outputs and public interventions––moving past detached observations to active 
participation in developing the problem. In this case journalists, practitioners and 
advocates who were active on social media were among the key actors, so we 
felt it was appropriate format for us to disseminate research through social 
media and blogging as well as through more conventional academic dissemination. 
But there are other avenues to explore.  
 
This case centres on the use of digital tools, such as machine learning and 
artificial intelligence, which are, just like the tools we used, often tied to 
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specific, narrow problem articulations and data sources. If we are permitted a 
leap, we might suggest that these tools could also be used in a more open, 
exploratory, and questioning way. So rather than using digital techniques to 
contain, capture, or eliminate problems, they might also be used to develop a 
problem – to gather publics and allow alternative definitions of the problem to 
unfold. This would require embracing uncertainty and indeterminacy about the 
limits and difficulties of working with digital tools. 
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2 See Neyland and Milyaeva (2016); Savransky, (2018 forthcoming). 
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30 words displayed, clustered horizontally by modularity algorithm in Gephi. 
14 The story was almost accurate. It was the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, that bought the data, and it was for 
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